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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN R. SWAUGER, 
A ppellam.t, 
-vs.-
W. C. LAWLER, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7316 
Appealed From the Third Judicial District Court In and 
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
HoNORABLE CLARENCE E. BAKER and. 
RAY VANCoTT, JR., Judges 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment of "No Cause of 
Action" entered against the plaintiff-appellant, and in 
favor of the defendant-respondent. The notice of appeal 
indicates that the appeal is taken from the findings of 
fact, and judgment, and from the order of the District 
Court vacating and setting aside the judgment formerly 
entered April 9, 1948 in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, 
and against the defendant-respondent. (R. 54.) 
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The respondent deems the statement of facts as out-
lined by the appellant to be insufficient, and will here-
after set forth certain additional facts. Before doing 
so however, respondent raises three points which are 
believed to be determinative of this appeal, and which 
preclude a consideration of the matters raised by the 
Appellant on this appeal. 
POINT I. 
Since No Bill of Excep,tions Was Filed or Settled, the Appeal 
Is On the Judgment Roll Only, and the Only Question for 
Review is. the Question of the Sufficiency of the Pleadings 
To Sustain the Judgment. 
No bill of exceptions was served, settled or filed in 
this action, and for that reason, there is nothing before 
the court to review except the matters presented by the 
judgment roll. Byron v. Utah Copper Co., 53 Utah 151, 
178 Pac. 53; Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 Pa.c. 
214. 
The cases are numerous holding that when no bill 
of exceptions is filed, the only question that can be de-
termined is whether the pleadings are sufficient to sup-
port the findings and judgment. Coates v. Allen, 88 
Utah 545, 56 P. 2d 612; Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 
157, 292 Pac. 214; Hutchinson v. Smart, 51 Utah 172, 
169 Pac. 166; Metz v. Jackson, 43 Utah 496, 136 Pac. 
784; Bryant v. Kunkel, 32 Utah 377, 90 Pac. 1039; Gray 
v. Defa, 103 Utah 342, 135 P. 2d 251; Atkinson v. Pelli-
grino, 110 Utah 363, 173 P. 2d 543. 
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POINT II. 
The Pleadings are Sufficient to Sustain the Judgment of 
No Cause of Action. 
While this matter is raised by the appellant's no-
tice of appeal, it is not assigned as error in the state-
ment of issues, nor is it argued by the appellant in his 
brief. See Coates v. Allen, 88 Utah 545, 56 P. 2d 612; 
where the effect of such failure is fully discussed, and 
under facts similar to the present case on this point, the 
Supreme Court held that there was nothing to review. 
The pleadings indicate that the plaintiff was pro-
ceeding upon the theory of a loan. The amended answer 
and the second amended answer both affirmatively al-
lege a business enterprise entered into by the plaintiff, 
the defendant, and others, whereby this money allegedly 
loaned to the defendant was actually a contribution to-
ward the capital of the business venture. The findings 
uphold the defendant that this was in fact so, and the 
court entered its judgment of ''No Cause of Action''. 
There is nothing irregular in the judgment roll relative 
to the pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of law, or 
judgment. 
When an appeal is taken on the judgment roll alone, 
the Supreme Court is bound to assume that the findings 
of the trial court were true and supported by the evi-
dence. Byron v. Utah Copper Co., 53 Utah 151, 178 Pac. 
53; Atkinson v. Pellegrino, 110 Utah 358, 173 P. 2d 543. 
POINT III. 
Having Failed to Serve, File and Settle a Bill of Exceptions, 
Relating to the Proceedings Had Whereby the Prior 
Judgment Was Set Aside, the Appellant Has F'ailed to 
Preserve This Issue for Review by the· Supreme Court. 
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The motion to open or vacate a judgment under 
Section 104-14-4 U.C.A. 1943, affidavits and othe-r pro-
ceedings had in support thereof, and the rulings and 
orders of court in regard thereto are no part of the 
judgment roll. Section 104-39-4, U.C.A. 1943. In order 
for the appellant to preserve this matter for review 
upon appeal he must have presented a bill of exceptions 
in the proper manner in order that this court might pass 
upon the questions, and in the absence of such a bill of 
exceptions, there is nothing before this court to be re-
viewed. 
In the case of Johnson v. Continental Casualty Co., 
78 Utah 18, 300 Pac. 1032, at page 22, this rule is an,.. 
nounced in the following language: 
'' * * * The application for relief under sec-
tion 6619 (present section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943) 
presents an issue which must be tried by the 
court as any other issue, and before any party 
is entitled to have a decision on such an issue 
reviewed on appeal it is necessary that the pro-
ceedings had thereunder be incorporated in a 
bill of exceptions duly authenticated by the cer-
tificate of the judge. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 
6971 ; Somers v. Somers, 81 Cal. 608, 22 P. 967. 
The matter of granting relief under section 6619 
(104-14-4) rests largely within the sound discre-
tion of the court to which the application is made, 
and his rulings with respect thereto will not or-
dinarily be disturbed unless it is made apparent 
that the court has abused such discretion. Clear-
ly, the party who seeks a reversal of such an 
order has the duty o£ bringing to this court a 
properly authenticated record by a bill of excep-
tions of the proceeding had before the court on 
that particular issue. This was not done, and for 
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that reason the motion of respondent must pre-
vail. 
Since no ruling is presented for review, ex-
cept as is required to be exhibited by a bill of ex-
ceptions, and since there is no bill, it follows that 
the judgment of the district court must be, and 
the same is affirmed. 
Other cases to like effect are Madsen, et al, v. Hod-
son, et al., 69 Utah 527, 256 Pac. 792; Cornelius v. Mo-
have Oil Co., 66 Utah 22, 239 Pac. 475; and see generally 
on this question Evans v. Jones, 10 Utah 182, 37 Pac. 
262, and J\tfcCullough v. McCullough, 37 Utah 148, 106 
Pac. 665. 
In the case of Madsen v. Hodson, supra, a bill of 
exceptions had been filed ; however, the bill of exceptions 
contained only a minute entry which purported to record 
the action of the court in overruling a motion to vacate 
the judgment. The record did disclose the motions made, 
and the supporting affidavits apparently, but these mat-
ters were not to be found in the settled bill of exceptions. 
This Supreme Court held that the matter was not before 
it for review, in the following language: 
'' * * * The very purpose of asking this court 
to review a ruling of the trial court on a motion 
of this nature is to· determine whether the court 
abused its discretion. The motion, if there was 
one, to vacate the judgment, and the evidence in 
support of that motion, not being properly certi-
fied to this court, cannot be reviewed by us. Every 
presumption is that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion. ' ' 
See also the case of Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah 
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575, 290 Pac. 950, wherein the necessity for a bill of 
exceptions covering proceedings had under Section 104-
14-4, U.C.A. 1943, is further recognized, and for a case 
wherein such a bill of exceptions was properly brought, 
and the matter reviewed. 
"An examination of Section 104-30-14, U.C.A. 
1943, indicates that the motion to set aside or 
vacate judgment, affidavits in support thereof, 
and order and proceedings had thereon are not 
a part of the judgment roll, unless a bill of ex-
ceptions is preserved on these points and included 
in the appeal.'' 
ADDITIONAL STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
While respondent takes the position that the-re IS 
nothing before the court to be reviewed relative to the 
order of the District Court opening and vacating the 
former judgment, and that therefore the appeal must 
be determined in favor of the respondent, he nonethe-
less, without waiving said position desires to answer 
the arguments of the appellant, and meet the issues 
raised by appellant in his brief, and in order to do so, 
it is felt that an additional statem~nt of facts might be 
helpful to the court. 
The appellant and the respondent, together with 
J. E. Rafferty (R. 29) and one Weston Daines (Def. Ex. 
1, R. 56) proposed the purchase of an airplane for their 
joint use and benefit (R. 48). The parties purchased the 
airplane in September, 1946, in the name of Air Service 
Inc., a corporation to be formed. The appellant gave to 
the respondent his check for $1,000.00 (Pl. Ex. A) to 
ward the purchase price of said airplane which sum was 
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utilized, together with sums of money similarly contri-
buted by Raferty (R. 29) and respondent. 
The parties consulted counsel for the purpose of 
incorporating this joint venture. The articles of incor-
poration were signed but they were never filed, and a 
charter never issued by the State of Utah. The said cor-
poration was never completed due to sudden financial 
reverses requiring full attentio~ of the parties to other 
matters. The airplane was purchased in the summer of 
1946 and used intermittently until the spring of 1947, 
at which time the parties were unable to maintain install-
ment payments required under the contract of purchase, 
and the lienholder repossessed said airplane. The net 
result of this venture was a loss of ail the funds which 
had been invested in said airplane, and which fund.s in-
cluded the $1,000.00 which appellant later alleges was 
a loan. (R. 1.) 
A complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court on January 16, 1947 (R. 1) by Barclay and Bar-
1 
clay, appellant's counsel who later withdrew. (R. 6.) 
The case was set for April 7, 1948. The day before 
the trial the respondent was driving from Ashton, Idaho 
to Salt Lake City, to appear at the trial (R. 28) the fol-
lowing day, April 7th. While enroute, he became ill due 
to a severe attack of hemorrhoids and was unable to 
drive his automobile, so he parked on the highway and 
attended to himself. Respondent was unable to reach 
Salt Lake City in time for the trial. He sent a telegram 
to his counsel the morning of April 7th, requesting a 
continuance. The telegram did not reach the counsel in 
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time. The counsel representing respondent at this the 
first trial was an associate sent over to court by the 
respondent's retained counsel of record, McKay, Burton 
and White. Reed Richards (R. 11) who appeared at the 
first trial was not known and is still not known to the 
respondent, nor was he his attorney. Richards asked 
for a continuance which was denied. After hearing the 
evidence of the plaintiff only, judgment was granted as 
prayed. 
Judgment was entered on April 9, 1948, by the 
clerk of the court. A motion for a new trial made on 
April 12, 1948, was denied on May 22, 1948 (R. 21). 
Thereafter, on July 8th, within 90 days as provided for 
in Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943, respondent, through his 
present counsel filed a motion to open or vacate the 
judgment on grounds provided in section 104-14-4, to-
gether with his affidavit (R. 48) in support thereof. 
This motion and affidavit interposing his defense for 
the first time was heard by th-e same Judge who heard 
the original motion for a new trial. This motion was 
granted. 
PO:JNT IV. 
The Motion to Open or Vacate Judgment Filed By the 
Respondent Was Filed Under the Provisions of Section 
104-14-4, U .C.A.. 1943, to Vacate or Open a J udgmenJt on 
the Grounds of Excusable Neglect, as Provided 
By That Section. 
This was not a motion to allow the defendant (Re-
spondent) to file a motion for a new trial, as where he 
has failed within the requisite time under section 104-
40-4, U.C.A. 1943, to file such motion, and he thereafter 
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seeks permission to do so. Such a proceeding is provided 
for under Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943, as is also the 
proceeding \Yhich the respondent in fact instituted. The 
distinction between the two is clearly set forth in the 
ease of Thomas v. ~iorris, 8 Utah 284; and in Madsen v. 
Hodson, 69 Utah 527, 256 Pa.c. 792. 
The case of Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac. 
1023, relied upon by the appellant, has no application 
to such a motion as "'"a.s here filed. The Luke v. Cole-
man ease \Yas one \vherein the losing party filed a mo-
tion for new trial whieh motion was argued and decided 
adversely to him. He thereafter filed a motion for a re-
hearing and reargument of the motion for new trial. 
The Supreme Court held that the District Court had no 
power to entertain such a mot-ion, that it "Tas not a 
recognized pleading. 
The grounds for setting aside a judgment for ex-
cusable neglect whereby the respondent was precluded 
by his unavoidable absence from setting up what later 
proved to be a valid defense, differs vastly from the 
review upon the ordinary motion for a new trial under 
Section 104-40-4. Judge Baker of the District Court, 
heard both motions.-Ne\v Trial (R. 21) Motion to open 
or vacate judgment (R. 33, 34). Obviously he considered 
the grounds. in the second instance to be sufficiently 
different and that the defendant had been precluded 
from setting up his defense under circumstances which 
would justify a vacation of the original judgment, and 
for this reason he vacated the judgment, in order to 
promote substantial justice bet,veen the parties as \vas 
his discretionary power under Section 10!-14-4, U.C.A. 
9 
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1943. What the substance of the argument was in the 
court below on the motion for new trial does not appear 
from the record before the Supreme Court. Present· 
counsel for the respondent, did not represent respondent 
in the proceedings~ had to that point. If, as argued by 
the appellant, the same matters were gone into in both 
instances, seemingly the burden should be upon appel-
lant to sustain his position. Respondent's position in 
this regard is sustained by the ruling of Judge Baker, 
by his order vacating the former judgment upon the 
showing made before h~m on that matter. "Every pre-
sumption is that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion". Madsen v. Hodson, 69 Utah 527, 256 Pac. 792. 
Respondent takes the position that the fact that Judge 
Baker made both rulings, (Denial of motion for new 
trial, and order opening and vacating judgment) is 
strongly indicative that different matters were encom-
passed in the two motions. Certainly the court cannot 
say from anything which appears before it, that the 
grounds were the same. 
POINT V. 
The Nature of th-e Respondent's Defense Below Was Such 
That It Was Necessary F'or Him To Be Personally Present. 
If the motion, affidavits and order on the motion 
to vacate or open the judgment are before the court, and 
this latter part of respondent's brief is predicated upon 
that supposition, then the nature of the respondent's 
defense in this matter is set forth, and it was apparent 
that his presence was absolutely necessary in order to 
properly and adequately present that defense. The trial 
court, .on the showing before it, exercised his discretion 
10 
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in the matter, and upon a trial of the issue on its merits 
before yet another judge the defense was interposed 
and sustained. It is submitted that this honorable court 
should not under such facts and circumstances overrule 
the lo·w·er court. The rna tter of granting relief under 
this section rests largely \Yi thin the sound discretion 
of the court to \Yhich application is made. Johnson v. 
Cont. Casualty Co., 78 Utah 18, 300 Pac. 1032; Hurd v. 
Ford, 7 4 Utah 46, 276 Pac. · 908; Blythe and Fargo Co. 
v. s,,~ensen, 15 Utah 345, 49 Pac. 1027; Thomas v. Morris, 
8 Utah 284. 
POINT VI. 
Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943, is Designed to Insure Insofar 
As Possible That Parties Litigant Will Be Protected Where 
Misfortune of the Type and Nature Set Forth Herein 
Has Occurred. 
While it is true that many of the cases wherein the 
court's have vacated judgments, have been cases wherein 
default judgments have been entered, the statute in no 
way limits its use to those cases, nor has the Supreme 
Court so construed it. Appellant concedes that not all 
cases where relief has been granted are default cases. 
Where the facts bring the case within the section of the 
statute, and the court in the exercise of its wise discre-
tion has determined that the facts are sufficient upon 
which to grant the relief authorized in the statute, and 
a trial on the merits in which the resporulent's defense 
is fully sustained, the respondent takes the position that 
this court should not seek to restrict the use of this 
remedy, particularly in view of the fact that the merits 
11 
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of respondent's defense have been upheld, and the ap-
pellant has not sought to review those merits. 
Appellant relies upon the case of Campbell v. Union 
Savings & Investment Company, 63 Utah 336, 226 Pac. 
190, in support of his contention that the lower court 
erred in granting the motion to vacate judgment. The 
facts of that case reveal that it was a. suit to quiet. title. 
The question was whether the court abused its discre-
tion in failing or refusing to vacate the judgment. The 
court tried the case in the absence of the defendant and 
its attorney and this was relied upon by the defendant 
in that case. Defendant's attorney contended that he 
did not have proper notice of the trial date, therefore 
judgment should be set aside. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the trial court and denied the defendant's motion 
to vacate. 
In the present case, there was no default, nor any 
contention of lack of notice. What the defendant ( re-
spondent) did by his motion was to ask for his day in 
court in order to interpose his defense, and the basis of 
his motion was that of excusable neglect and illness. 
This differs vastly from the failure of the defendant's 
attorney in the Campbell case to 'diligently discover that 
the case was to be tried, where court rules relative to 
such notice had been complied with. 
Appellant also relies upon the case of Peterson v. 
Crozier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860. This was a seduction 
case. The defendant did not appear at the trial although 
he had ample notice of the time and place where it was 
to be held. His excuse was that he could not leave his 
job for he would lose it. The Supreme Court on review 
12 
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sustained the lo\Yer court in holding that this was not 
excusable neglect, stating that the affidavit rather than 
sho,ving excusable neglect, tended to show a deliberate 
intention on his part to abandon his defense and permit 
the plaintiff to take a. judgment against him. In the 
present case the defendant "\Yas sick and ill enroute to 
the trial, and although represented by an attorney, it 
"·as other than counsel actually retained by him, and 
one who did not kno"\v the facts of the case, nor have the 
file of the case. 
It should further be borne in mind that in the 
present case the lower court upheld the contention that 
excusable neglect existed, and he vacated the judgment. 
The review is only as to abuse of discretion, and where 
he is supported as in the present case, there is no abuse 
of discretion shown. The two cases relied upon by ap-
pellant are distinguishable, but they do have one feature 
in common-the court in each instance held that there 
was no abuse of discretion. Respondent contends that 
such should be the ruling in the present case. 
The court having exercised its discretion in this 
matter, there is no merit in the contention that laches, 
even if available to appellant in this action, should act 
as a bar to the respondent. There is nothing to indicate 
in any event that appellant should prevail under a 
theory of laches since all that is shown is the bare pas-
sage of 90 days' time from the entry of judgment, and 
only a matter of 46 days from the overruling. of his 
motion for a new trial. Something more than the mere 
passage of time is contemplated in order that a party 
may prevail under the doctrine of laches. Mary J a.ne 
13 
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Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 
57 P. 2d 1099. There is nothing indicating any change 
of position, nor does the appellant so argue. He argues 
that there has been hardship on the plaintiff in having 
to return to again fight the case. This argument loses 
sight of the equities as between the parties. The court 
in the second instance held that the plaintiff did not 
have a cause of action at all. He cannot be heard to 
complain that having recovered a judgment on a claimed 
cause of action that had no validity, that he has been 
injured when the gain in the form of the judgment has 
been taken away from him where the court has ruled 
that he is not entitled to that gain. What tiie court did 
in vacating the first judgment was clearly ''in further-
ance of justice" (Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943). 
The time for filing an appeal from the original 
judgment had not run when respondent entered his mo-
tion before the court to vacate or open the judgment. 
It is difficult to see how laches could bar the respondent 
from one type of relief authorized by the statute during 
the time when that relief is available to him in the dis-
cretion of the court, when no other of his rights under 
other statutes have expired. 
The appellant's statement of the issue relative to 
laches is that respondent is barred from asserting an 
affidavit to support a motion for new trial, because such 
affidavit was not filed at the time the motion for new 
trial was filed. Since the rna tter in issue is a motion to 
vacate or open a judgment on the grounds of excusable 
neglect, this assertion is without merit. 
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POINT VII. 
There Was No Error or Abuse of Discretion on the Part 
of the Court in Permitting Amendment of the Answer. 
The second amended answer was filed to comply 
""ith the order of court to enable the pleadings to con-
form to the proofs. There was an immaterial variance 
'vhich the second amended answer corrected. An exami-
nation of the amended answer and the second amended 
answer, together with the findings of fact, will disclose 
that the variance was not a. material one. The respond-
ent's theory was that the appellant had engaged in a 
business enterprise with the respondent and others. The 
exact nature of that enterprise is immaterial. The im-
portant thing is the determination that he did in fact 
enter into such au enterprise. The amended answer 
alleged this to be a. corporation, the proofs established 
a joint venture. 
The amended answer was interposed in order that 
defendant might properly take advantage of the de-
fense available to him. The judgment had previously 
been vacated, and an affidavit filed setting forth the 
substance and nature of the proposed defense, and 
therefore the appellant had notice of the proposed de-
fense. It was a matter of discretion with the court 
whether he would allow such amendment. There was no 
abuse of that discretion. 
The case of McMillan v. Forsythe, 47 Utah 571, 154 
Pac. 959, has no application to this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
It IS respectfully submitted ~hat there is nothing 
before this honorable court whereby a review can be had 
of the proceedings relating to the motion to vacate or 
open the judgment and proceedings had thereon, and 
that the lower court should be affirmed on the judgment 
roll, since no other contention is made in this appeal, 
save those matters referring to the motion and proceed-
ings had subsequent thereto. The pleadings amply sus-
tain the judgment on the merits. 
If the motion and proceedings subsequent thereto 
are properly before this honorable court, then it is 
respectfully submitted that the proceedings sustain the 
district court in its vacation of the judgment, and there 
is nothing indicating an abuse of that discretion, and 
the appellants position on appeal is without merit. 
Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEONARD S. RALPH, 
Attorney for Respondent 
and. Defendant. 
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